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FUTURE PROPERTY INTERESTS IN KENTUCKY*
vu. Twm RuLv AGAINST PERPETUITIES
The law student of fifty years ago was supposed to know
the rule in Shelley's case and the rule against perpetuities when
he went before the bar examiners to be admitted to practice. If
he could show that he had mastered these two rules it was
thought he had a thorough knowledge of real property law. To-
day the rule in Shelley's case is no longer law in this state nor
in many others. The rule against perpetuities, however, still
stands. In fact, it has been said that a study of the cases shows
that the development of the law has steadily tended toward the
elimination of all restrictions, other than with respect to remote-
ness.'
The rule as stated by Professor Gray is as follows: "No
interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twen-
ty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the in-
terest.": Mr. Tiffany in his work on Real Property3 gives it in
these words: "Any limitation or provision, the purpose or possi-
ble effect of which is to cause an estate to commence in the future,
is invalid if, as a result thereof, an estate may commence more
than twenty-one years after a life or lives in being."*
From both of these statements of the rule it will be seen
that it "is concerned only with the time of commencement, the
vesting, of estates and not with the duration thereof." The
earlier English cases threw some doubt on this point as to
whether the rule was one dealing with the vesting of interests
or the alienability of future interests. In the Duke of Norfolk
* Earlier installments of this article are published in XII, Ky. Law
Journal, 58, 115, 210, and volume XIII, p. 32.
1 Spitz on Conditional and Future Interests in Property, p. 54.
2 Rule against perpetuities (3rd Ed.) section 201.
3 Second Edition, volume 1, p. 591.
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case,4 1682, Lord Nottingham said: "A perpetuity is the settle-
ment of an estate or an interest in tail, with such remainders
expectant upon it, as are in no sort in the power of the tenant
in tail in possession, to dock by any recovery or assignment, but
such remainder must continue as perpetual clogs upon the
estate; such do fight against God, for they pretend to such a
stability in human affairs, as the nature of them admits not of,
and they are against the reason and the policy of the law, and
therefore not to be endured." Also in Scatterwood v. Edge5
the court defined a perpetuity as "an estate unalienable though
all mankind join in the conveyance," and again in Washburn v.
Downs6 as "where, if all that have interest join, yet they can
not bar or pass the estate."
The case was finally settled in England in 1882, in the de-
cision of the Loindon & Southwestern Railway Co. v. G&mn,7
where the court said: "It is impossible to assert as a general pro-
position that where the owner of an estate and the owner of
such a contingent interest can together make a good title, or
one can release to the other, the rule of perpetuities does not
apply."
In this, country, largely through the influence of Professor
Gray, it is today pretty generally conceded that the rule. is one
against remoteness of vesting and not against inalienability.
During the middle of the last century, however, several states,
following the. lead of New York, enacted statutes similar to that
passed in Kentucky in 1852. The present act reads as follows:
"The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended, by
any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than
during the continuance of a life or lives in being at the creation
of the estate, and twenty-one years and ten months thereafter." s
The courts in the states9 having such enactments have ever since
been confronted with the question of whether the legislators in-
tended thereby to re-enact the common law rule, to revoke it, or
to establish a new rule against restraints on alienation.
4 3 Ch. Cas. 1.
'1 Soek. 229.
0 1 Ch. Cas. 213.
20 Ch. Div. 562.
s Ky. Stat., Section 2360.
9 Arizona, California, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan,
Minnesota, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
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The New York court at first held that the statute changed
the common law rule as to perpetuities and made inalienability
the test and not remoteness of vesting, but in the case of In re
Wilcox,'o in construing the section concerning contingent re-
mainders, the court took the view that the statute provided
against remoteness of vesting and required the contingency to
occur within the period fixed. The Michigan court in Niles v.
Mason" reached a similar result in construing a similar statute.
The Wisconsin court, however, has followed the earlier New
York cases and in Becker v. Chester'2 set forth its position that
the common law rule was abrogated by the statute, that the
power of alienation is not suspended where. there are living
persons who have unitedly the entire ownership and may, pres-
ently, lawfully join in an absolute conveyance of the real prop-
erty. It "Went further and approved the language of Ryan, C.
J., speaking for the court in an earlier case where he said: "The
statute limiting the rule against perpetuities to realty, mani-
festly abrogates the English doctrine as applicable to person-
alty."
Mr. Nelson Trottman, however, in an excellent article on
Perpetuities under the Wisconsin statutes'3 takes a different
view of the effect of the Wisconsin statutes. He says: "This
rule was universally recognized in common law jurisdictions
when the statute was passed, although the question of aliena-
bility had not at that time been definitely settled. If the ex-
press language of the statutes compels the result in DeIVolf v.
Lawson, and in decisions in accord therewith, namely, that a
new statutory limitation unknown to the common law, is created
whereby there is now placed a limitation upon the duration of
present vested inalienable interests, it should not be overlooked
that the section in question contains no reference in terms, to
the rule against perpetuities, nor is this or any other section of
the statutes necessarily inconsistent with the rule. It would,
therefore, seem to follow that the rule would be in force as at
common law. The statute merely says that the absolute power
of alienation shall not be suspended beyond the period named.
The statute does not say that future unvested alienable inter-
10 194 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497.
S126 Mich. 482, 85 N. W. 1100."115 Wis. 90, 91 S. W. 87.
2 Wis. Law Review, 14, 26.
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ests may be created. Such interests were void at common law,
and, not being expressly permitted by the statute, nor permitted
by necessary implication, are, it would seem, no more allowable
since the statute than before."
In Kentucky the question of the meaning of this statute
seems to have given the court trouble as elsewhere. For in-
stance, in Patterson v. Patteroe1 4 the court said the purpose
of the statute was not to compel the vesting of estates, but to
prohibit unreasonable restraints upon alienation. However, in
the recent case of Cammack v. Allen' 5 the court fell into line
with the better view. It was contended that the statute was
aimed at restraints on alienation and since it forbade restraints
on alienation for a longer period than that named in the act it
impliedly permitted such restraint for a shorter period. The
court denied that the statute was applicable to cases dealing
with restraints on alienation. "It has been," the court said,
"a statute of this state for a long number of years and has
always been treated and referred to in the opinions of this court
as Kentucky's statute against perpetuities. Long since its
enactment and while it was a live and vital statute of this state,
all of the opinions, supra, on the power to restrain alienation
were rendered and in each of them the question as to the right
to restrain alienation of the fee by a person to whom it was con-
veyed and was considered from the standpoint of the common
law rule upon the subject and the right to impose partial re-
straints was grafted on to the common law rule by this court
as a pro tanto exception thereto. In none of the opinions was
the statute referred to as creating a rule with reference to the
imposition of such restraints, but, as stated in numerous cases,
it was referred to as our statute against perpetuities, three of
which are IKasey v. Fidelity Trust Co., 131 Ky. 604; Miler v.
Miller, 151 Ky. 563, and Curd v. Curd, 163 Ky. 473. The stat-
ute, therefore, has in effect been construed to apply only to
cases and situations where the suspension of alienation was due
to the postponement of the vesting of the fee in a person who
could alienate it. If such postponement is beyond the life or
lives of persons in being and twenty-one years and ten months
after the creation of the estate it comes within not only the
common law rule against perpetuities but violates the quoted
" 135 Ky. 339, 1909.
5199 Ky. 268, 1923.
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section of our statute which was but declaratory of the common
law rule and was intended only as a statute against perpetni-
ties and not one dealing with the right of alienation by a person
in whom the fee vested within a permissible period prescribed
by it."
This puts the law of this state in line with the Michigan
decision and the recent New York cases, and Professor Gray's
position that the rule is one against remoteness of vesting and
not inalienability. The court in a still later ease, Clay v. Ander-
son10 supports this view, where it is said: "That section of the
statute (section 2360) means that no limited or conditional es-
tate may ever be carved from the fee that may extend and post-
pone the vesting of the remainder interest for a longer period
of time than the duration of the life or lives of the person or
persons in being at the creation of such estate, and twenty-one
years and ten months thereafter."
The reasons for the development of such a rule are so clearly
stated in the opinion of Chief Justice Boyle in the decision of
Moore's Trustees v. Howe's Heirs,17 1826, that it seems worth
while quoting his argument in full. He said: "Naturally no
man has a power of directing to whom or in what manner his
estate shall pass after his death; for, when he ceases to be, his
power necessarily ceases with him. His power, therefore, in this
respect must depend upon the positive instructions of society.
To stimulate to industry and economy, and to enable parents
to exert a beneficial influence over their children and make such
arrangements as may suit the exigencies of their families, the
law of this country, as well as that of most other civilized na-
tions, has given to every one of competent capacity the power
of directing by will to whom his estate shall pass. But, al-
though it is reasonable that a man should have power of thus
disposing of his estate after his death, it is obviously as reason-
able that he should not have the power of directing its disposi-
tion for all time to come; and the law, while for beneficial pur-
poses, it concedes to every one the power of directing to whom
his estate after his death shall go, has at the same time been
careful that this power should not be abused. To prevent, there-
fore, estates from being locked up forever from commercial
:'203 Ky. 384.
"4 T. B. Monroe 199.
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and social purposes, it has forbiden perpetuities, and fixed a
period beyond which no one is allowed to direct how his estate
shall devolve. That period is for life, or lives in being, and
twenty-one years and a few months, and the rule is the same in
this cofintry, in relation both to real and personal estate. A
man cannot, therefore, devise over an estate to take effect after
that period, and, if he does so, the limitation over will be void,
and the person who takes the preceding estate will have the fee
simple or absolute property in the estate devised."
In determining whether the rule against perpetuities ap-
plies to a particular case, the language of the particular in-
strument is first construed regardless of the rule, and when
the testator's meaning is once settled the court will then see
whether the gift may possibly not vest until after the period
fixed by the statute. The court in several cases has pointed out
that the test is not whether the event or contingency named
does happen or may happen, but whether it is possible for it not
to happen within the time. If it is possible that the event or
contingency upon which the estate is to vest may not happen
within the prescribed limits, the gift is void.lS As the court put
it in Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lloyd: "If by any possibility the
vesting may be postponed beyond the period, the limitation
over will be void.''1 Nor does it save the limitation if circum-
stances turn out so as to render the limitation within the period
allowed, for the limitation must be valid from the bergiimig and
for the full time, under all conditions or not at all.
2 0
Furthermore, the court in applying the rule of perpetui-
ties has refused to fix a period in the life of a woman beyond
which she cannot bear children. This question came up in
Tyler v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Companly,21 where trustees
were directed to use the income from testator's property for
the support of his son's wife and their children "now in being
or hereafter born" and after the death of the son and daughter-
in-law to apportion the rents and profits among testator's
grandchildren and their descendants and after the death of
the last surviving grandchild to divide the estate between testa-
tor's great-grandchildren or their descendants. At the death
Tyler v. Fidelity d- Columbia Trust Co., 158 Ky. 280, 164 S. W. 939.
"9 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1827, 78 S. W. 896.
"Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 140 Ky. 608.
21158 Ky. 280. Rand v. Smith, 153 Ky. 516.
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of the testator the son had five children and none were born
thereafter. It was contended that the wife was beyond the
childbearing age and the son beyond the age of procreation, and
therefore the gift to the great-grandchildren was not within
the prohibition of the rule, but the court rejected the argument
and followed the rule early established by the English court,
namely, never to suppose it impossible for persons of advanced
years to have children.
22
In applying the rule cases are often presented to the court
where a devise is valid in part and void in part. In such cases
it is always held that if the good is severable from the bad, the
good part will stand.
23
We come then to a consideration of interests that are sub-
ject to the rule. As already seen from the general principles
just stated neither present nor vested interests are subject to
it. It is necessary to turn to the cases to see whether the court
has held gifts to a class, equitable estates, reversions, rights of
entry for condition broken, powers of appointment and charit-
able trusts within the rule.
The rule against perpetuities has probably come before the
court most frequently in cases of gifts over to a class after a
gift to a life interest. In Johnsan's Trustee v. Johnson2 4 it was
provided that after the death of the life tenant the income
should go to the life tenant's children until the youngest should
reach the age of twenty-five years, when the estate, should be
divided. It was held that this provision violated the rule as
the remainder might vest after a life in being and twenty-one
years. In Fidelity & Columbid Trust Co. v. Tiffany 5 a gift
to trustees for testator's grandchildren living at the testator's
death and born within ten years thereafter, to be paid upon his
arriving at the age of twenty-two years, was held not vested and
therefore within the rule. In Lindner v. Ehrich20 a gift to a
wife for life, to testator's son and daughter for life, and
remainder to grandchildren for life and then, over to cer-
tain kindred was void. However, in Ennen v. Air27  a
Jlee v. Audley, 1787, 1 Cox 324.
13Attorney General v. Wallace's Devisees, 7 B. Mon. 611; Armstrong
v. Armstrong, 14 B. Mon. 333; Johnson's Trustee v. Johnson, 79 S. W.
293, 25 Ky. L. R. 2119.
79 S. W. 293, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2119.
- 202 Ky. 618.
- 147 Ky. 85.
104 S. W. 960, 31 Ky. L. R. 1184.
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gift to a wife for life and after her death to her and testator's
children, to be equally divided "between all male and female
to them and their offspring they are only to have the use of it
during their lifetime" was held good as all testator's children
were in existence when the will took effect and the limitation
over to the grandchildren did not violate the rule. And in
Dohn's Exor. v. Dohn2 s the postponement of vesting until the
death of testator 's widow or the arrival of the youngest child
at twenty-five years of age, whichever event should happen first,
was held not within the rule as the youngest child was living at
testator's death. Finally, in U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Douglas' Trustee,29 and in Laughldin v. Elliott,30 the court fol-
lowed the holding of earlier Kentucky decisions that in the ab-
sence of clear words of qualification the term "grandchildren"
would not be limited to grandchildren living at the time of tes-
tator's death, and in both cases gifts to grandchildren were held
void.
The general rule that equitable estates are within the rule
as well as legal, seems not to have been raised directly in any
case coming before the court, but seems to have been taken for
granted in several cases.31
Since a reversion is conceived of as vested as soon as
created the Kentucky court followed the well established rule
as to reversions in Harvey v. Bell32 that "neither the rule nor
the statute against perpetuities has any application to rever-
sions." And in Patterson v. Patterso4,33 where a deed con-
veyed land to a turnpike company for a tollhouse with a pro-
vision that on the cessation of such use the land should revert
to- certain named persons, instead of to the grantee herself, the
court held that the reversion or limitation over was not void as
a perpetuity. "Finally," the court said, "we are of the opin-
ion that the statute against perpetuities does not apply to a
conveyance of land for a public highway, or for use in connec-
tion with the operation of a turnpike, which is a public high-
way."
-110 Ky. 884.
"134 Ky. 374.
20202 Ky. 433.
"Johnson's Trustee v. Johnson, 79 S. W. 293; Brown v. Columbia
Finance & Trust Co., 123 Ky. 775; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lloyd, 78 S. W.
896.
"118 Ky. 512.
-135 Ky. 339, 345.
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As pointed out by Professor Gray, the court assumed in
Kenner v. American Contract Co.34 that a right of entry for con-
dition broken was valid as far as the rule against perpetuities
was concerned.
The case of Brown v. Columbia Finance & Trust Co.35
raised the point as to whether a power of appointment came
within the rule. The testator devised his property in trust for
the use of his daughter for life with power to appoint by will
to the use of any of her children or descendants, and in default
of such appointment to her heirs at law. By the will the
daughter appointed to her six children for their respective lives
with remainder in fee to their children. All the children were
born before the testator's death. The court took the view that
"the power of appointment given to the daughter by Robert
"Wickliffe could not be used to extend the estate created by his
will, or to postpone the vesting of the fee for a longer period
than Wickliffe himself could have done. To hold it valid would
be to say to the testator though restricted by the statute in the
capacity to create an estate beyond a life or lives in being and
twenty-one years and ten months thereafter, could, by a power
of appointment, vest in some other person the ability to further
extend the limitation, so as to defeat the purpose of the statute
against perpetuities. This we hold would be invalid." This
view is in accord with that held by Professor Gray and the
American courts. Professor Kales took the position that the
opposite holding of the later English cases is correct, since when
the estate passed under the will of the donee of the power the
latter was, for an instant at least, owner, and, therefore, the
time under the rule against perpetuities runs, not from the date
of the creation of the power, but from the date of the appoint-
ment under it.
The question of whether charitable trusts come within the
rule remains to be considered. The court in Gass v. Wilhite
3 6
decided that the trust under which the Society of Shakers held
land was valid. "For where the trust is established to be a
charitable use," the court said, "it is no objection whatever to
it, that it is a perpetuity also." The court in Harvey v. BeJUST
219 Bush 202; Gray, Perpetuities (3rd Ed.) section 307.
"123 Ky. 775.
"32 Ky. (! Dana) 170.
"118 Ky. 512.
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also observed to the same effect that "charitable trusts are, as
a rule, perpetual if they are successful, and the rule against
perpetuities has no application to charities after the right of
enjoyment begins. A charitable trust for the maintenance of
a hospital for the poor, an asylum for the indigent insane, for
the propagation of religion among the heathen, or for the dis-
tribution of Bibles is all the better that it is perpetual." -In
Kasey v. Fidelity Trust Co.3 8 a gift to the American Bible Society
was held valid, while in Coleman v. O'Leary's Executor3 9 a be-
quest in trust for masses for the repose of testator's soul
was valid, as well as a bequest of a certain sum "to be invested
and the income of which to be applied in rewards of merit to
pupils in the parochial poor schools in Louisville." However,
in the same case certain other gifts in trust were declared void
for want of an identified or ascertainable object. A provision
for the care of a grave stone or tomb, in the absence of a stat-
ute, was held in Street v. Cave Hill IRvestment 0.40 not a
charitable -gift and is void as a perpetuity, but the gift in the
particular case was within section 317 of the Kentucky Stat-
utes and valid. A gift to trustees for educational purposes was
held good under the same statute in Pullins v. Board of Eduica-
tion of Methodist Church4l and was not void as a peipetuity.
One further point in connection with charitable trusts
needs to be considered, and that is where the estate is not to
vest in the donee until after lives in being, twenty-one years
and ten months has elapsed. In Kasey v. Fidelity Trust C0.42
the devise was to testator's niece for life and "if my said niece
should die leaving no children or lawful issue surviving her,
or if such child or children should die leaving no lawful issue
surviving them, then in such event I bequeath and devise all
of the above estate . . . to the Fidelity Trust and Safety
Vault Company . . . to be held by them as an endowment
fund for the American Bible Society." It was contended that
an indefinite failure of issue was intended and therefore the
gift might not vest in the trustee until after the period allowed.
The court said that if this construction were correct undoubt-
"131 Ky. 609.
114 Ky. 388.
"191 Ky. 422.
478 S. W. 457, 25 Ky. L. R. 1715.
-131 Ky. 609.
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edly the position of the appellant was sound, that the trust
was void because inhibited by the rule forbidding perpetuities.
This is in harmony with Professor Gray's view that where the
gift is from an individual over to a corporation or person on
a charitable trust, it is well settled that the rule against perpe-
tuities applies.
43
For reasons already stated it is clear that the rule against
perpetuities has nothing to do with restraints on alienation,
with restrictions on the use or enjoyment of property, nor with
unlawful accumulations. It is the purpose of the writer to
consider those topics in another article.
University of Kentucky W. LEwis ROBERTS.
College of Law
(To be Continued.)
43Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd Ed.) section 594.
